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Abstract
Background: Systemic risk has received much more awareness after the excessive risk taking by major financial instituations
pushed the world’s financial system into what many considered a state of near systemic failure in 2008. The IMF for example
in its yearly 2009 Global Financial Stability Report acknowledged the lack of proper tools and research on the topic.
Understanding how disruptions can propagate across financial markets is therefore of utmost importance.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we use empirical data to show that the world’s markets have a non-linear threshold
response to events, consistent with the hypothesis that traders exhibit change blindness. Change blindness is the tendency
of humans to ignore small changes and to react disproportionately to large events. As we show, this may be responsible for
generating cascading events—pricequakes—in the world’s markets. We propose a network model of the world’s stock
exchanges that predicts how an individual stock exchange should be priced in terms of the performance of the global
market of exchanges, but with change blindness included in the pricing. The model has a direct correspondence to models
of earth tectonic plate movements developed in physics to describe the slip-stick movement of blocks linked via spring
forces.
Conclusions/Significance: We have shown how the price dynamics of the world’s stock exchanges follows a dynamics of
build-up and release of stress, similar to earthquakes. The nonlinear response allows us to classify price movements of a
given stock index as either being generated internally, due to specific economic news for the country in question, or
externally, by the ensemble of the world’s stock exchanges reacting together like a complex system. The model may provide
new insight into the origins and thereby also prevent systemic risks in the global financial network.
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Introduction
Like earthquakes, financial crises appear to be ever recurrent
phenomena with the unfolding of a given crisis strongly dependent
on the history that led up to the crunch. Whereas the continuous
build up of stress from tectonic plate movements is well understood
to be at the origin of earthquakes, the causes behind financial
distress remain unclear, with explanations often sought in singular
events.
Systemic risk in general refers to the risk of collapse of an entire
system. In a financial context, systemic risk can for example ocour
when the financial distress of major banks spreads through ripple
effects to other banks who have acted as counterparties in common
transactions with the banks in trouble [1]. The traditional
litterature on financial systemic risk usually deals with bank
contagion, looking at exposures where the default by one bank
would render other banks insolvent. Other more recent studies
however take a larger look at the financial system by studying
contagion in financial markets but typically only for one market at
a time [2–6]. A general survey of the topic can be found in [2]. In
[3,4] measures of systemic risk were proposed indirectly via
econometric techniques such as principal components analysis and
Granger-causality tests of four sectors: hedge funds, banks, brokers
and insurance companies. It was found that the level of systemic
risk has increased over the past decade because the four sectors
have become highly interrelated. In [5,6] it was similarly reported
that the US S&P500 market has beome prone to systemic collapses
since 2002 but using a different technique, the index cohesive force
(ICF), which measures the balance between stock correlations and
partical correlations (defined via an subtraction of the index). The
study in [5,6] provides a new way of looking at market dynamical
states and stability and transitions between such states, similar to
the motivation of the study proposed here. Crucial to such efforts
is to understand how disruptions can propagate througout the
system, as well as understand how correlations change as the states
of the markets change [7]. For example in [3,4] it was shown how
correlations increase during market crashes. For other studies on
market correlation structure see also [8], [9] and [10,11]. Very few
studies have been made of systemic risk at the largest possible
scale, the world. See however [12–14] showing some very
interesting studies including the worlds financial markets. We
argue that a proper understanding of systemic risks necessitates an
understanding at the system level of how disruptions can be
created and propagate across financial markets. We therefore
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2suggest a top-down view on global risks, but stress the relevance of
individual countries, by looking at the world’s network of stock
exchanges instead of focusing on individual markets. Of particular
interest will be to suggest new approaches to the risk of contagion
where the transmission of financial shocks can propagate across
countries. It is in this context that we present a model that takes a
holistic view of how pricing takes place in the world’s stock
markets.
Using empirical data we first illustrate how, in particular, big
price movements in a given stock exchange have impacts on the
other stock exchanges world-wide, whereas small price movements
have no impact on the other exchanges and go unnoticed. Such a
dynamics resemble very much the dynamics behind earthquakes
where small stresses first build up locally without any propagation.
However once sufficiently large, a stress will eventually be released
and propagate in sudden bursts. We use this insight to introduce a
network model of the world’s financial system. In the model each
stock exchange is represented as a block in a network that links any
two blocks with a spring of variable strength. As will be explained
below, the price movements of the stock exchanges are then
partially created by the stick-slip motion of the network of blocks,
something very similar to ideas originally introduced by Burridge
and Knopoff (BK) [15] to describe earthquakes caused by tectonic
plate movement. This allows a direct study of memory effects in
the global financial system, with stresses that build up over time
and are released in sudden bursts much like what is seen during
seismic activities of earthquakes. Thus, we emphasize a description
where the price movements of any given stock market can not be
solely understood by looking at the level of the individual stock
exchange and propose that a proper characterization needs to
account for system-wide movements at the global level.
Our objective is to study how stresses in the global financial
system of stock exchanges build up and propagate. In our model,
stress enters the system because of price movements of the indices,
represented by displacements of the blocks. Stress can either be
locally generated due to economic news for a specific index, or
globally generated due to the transfer of stress when a large price
movement happens for a given stock index. The idea is that a large
(eventually cumulative) price movement of a given stock index can
induce stresses on other stock indices world-wide to follow its price
movement. Similar to the BK model of earthquakes, we assume a
‘‘stick-slip’’ motion of the indices so that only a large (eventually
cumulative) movement of a given index has a direct impact in the
pricing of the remaining indices world-wide. In this line of thinking
‘‘price-quakes’’ can happen in the global financial system as
cascades of big price movements originate from one corner of the
globe and propagate world-wide like falling bricks of dominos. We
are thus representing the global financial system as a complex
system, characterized by important memory effects and path
dependence.
A key principle in finance states that as new information is
revealed, it immediately becomes reflected in the price of an asset
and thereby loses its relevance [16,17]. We suggest to combine this
principle with a behavioral trait which reflects the tendency of
humans to reply in a nonlinear fashion to changes, placing
emphasis on events with big changes and disregarding events with
modest information content. This is in agreement with experi-
ments made in psychology which have shown that humans react
disproportionally to big changes, a phenomenon called change
blindness since only large changes are taken into account whereas
small changes go unnoticed [18–20].
Change blindness has been reported in laboratory experiments
even when the participants are actively looking for changes. When
small rapid changes occur to photographs observers often miss
these changes, provided that the change is made during a saccade
[21], a flashed blank screeen [22], a blink [19], or some other
visual disruption [23]. For a review article on change-blindness see
e.g. [24].
As new information is produced at a given exchange, say the
opening or closing price of that particular market, it becomes part
of the information that other exchanges may or may not use in
their pricing. With the existence of futures contracts, this
information, as well as other economic news, is in principle priced
in instantaneously, even outside the opening hours of exchanges.
However if one uses the amount of trading volume as a proxy for
the relevance of the reaction to new information, it is the opening
(or respective closing) price that determines the most important
moment where new information generated prior to the current
exchange’s trading session becomes priced in. Thus, in the
following we will use the opening/closing (open/close) prices,
which usually correspond to times when the trading volume is
highest, as the values of the stocks/indices that become priced in
with new information.
Analysis
Imagine a trader who at the opening of the Tokyo stock
exchange tries to price in new world-wide information coming
from the other stock exchanges about what happened since the
markets last closed in Tokyo. We conceive that she/he does so by
taking into account both the release of local economic news in
Japan (that happened since the previous day’s close) as well as by
seeking out news about how other markets performed after the
markets closed in Tokyo. Because of the time zone differences,
new information at the opening in Tokyo would include the price
difference between the open and the close the day before for the
European and American markets. For the Australian market,
however, this would include the price difference between the close
of the day before and the open the same day, since this market is
the first market to open world-wide, and opens before the Japanese
markets. We postulate a universal behavioral mechanism in the
pricing done by traders evaluating two different terms i) local
economic news ii) big cumulative changes from other stock
exchanges weighted by their importance (in terms of capitaliza-
tion) and their relatedness (in terms of geographical positioning
representing e.g., overlap of common economic affairs or
importance as trading partners).
At time t, the trader of a given stock exchange i estimates the
price Pi(t) of the index as Pi(t)~Pi(t{1)exp(Ri(t)), with Ri(t)
the return of stock exchange i between time t{1 and t:
Ri(t)~
1
N 
i
X N
j=i
aijH(Rcum
j (t{1)wRC)|Rcum
j (t{1)bijzgi(t), ð1Þ
Rcum
j (t)~(1{H(Rcum
j (t{1)wRC))½Rcum
j (t{1)zRj(t) ð 2Þ
N 
i ~
X N
j=i
H(Rcum
j (t{1)wRC), aij~1{expf{Kj=(Kic)g,
bij~expf{(zi{zj)=tg
ð3Þ
N is the total number of stock exchanges. t stands for the time of the
close (respective open) of exchange i whereas t{1 is the time of the
last known information (close or open) of exchange j known at time t.
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return, t - the time scale of the impact across time zones, c the
scale of impact from capitalisation and si the standard deviation in
the noise term gi.
The reasoning behind (1)–(3) goes as follows: at the opening/
close of a given stock exchange i new internal economic news is
priced in via the second term in (1), gi, which represents internal
economic news only relevant for the specific index i. The first term
in (1) describes the fact that traders look up what has happened in
other stock markets world-wide, but it is only when a sufficiently
large (eventually cumlative) price move happens in another stock
exchange j that it has an influence on the stock exchange i. The
use of the Heaviside H-function ensures that the first term in (1) is
zero for small cumulative moves of stock exchange j, i.e. in this
case stock exchange i does not feel any influence from stock
exchange j. The pricing of stock exchange i however receives the
contribution aijRcum
j bij when a sufficiently large (wRC) cumula-
tive move happens at the stock exchange j. The two coefficients
aij,bij (explained further below) describe how big an influence a
price move of stock index j can have on the given stock index i.I t
is important to note that aij is assymetric, aij=aj,i since the impact
that a big price movement of stock index i has on another stock
index j is not the same as the impact of the same big price
movement of the stock index j on the stock index i. The factor N 
i
in (1) means that the index i takes into account an average impact
among the indices j that have the condition in the Heaviside
function fullfilled. (2) takes account of the fact that when a big
(eventually cumulative) price move of stock exchange j has had an
impact on stock exchange i it becomes ‘‘priced in’’. The ‘‘stress’’
due to the large cumulative move of stock exchange j, Rcum
j ,i s
therefore released and set equal to zero, something which is
accounted for via the 1{H term in (2).
aij is a coefficient that describes the influence of stock index j on
stock index i in terms of relative value of the capitalization Ki,Kj of
the two indices. A large c (c&1) corresponds to a network of the
world’s indices with dominance of the index with the largest
capitalization Kmax. Presently this is the U.S. financial market, so
choosing c large corresponds to the case where pricing in any
country only takes into account the movements of the U.S.
markets as external information. On the contrary a small c (c%1)
corresponds to a network of indices with equal strengths since aij
then becomes independent of i,j. In addition we assume that
countries which are geographically close also have larger
interdependence economically, as described by the coefficient
bij, with zi{zj the time zone difference of countries i,j. t gives the
scale over which this interdependence declines. Small t (t%1) then
corresponds to a world where only indices in the same time zone
are relevant for the pricing, whereas large t (t&1) describes a
global influence in the pricing independent of the difference in
time zone. The structure of (1) is similar to the Capital Asset
Figure 1. Illustration of change blindness: a large world market return (fig a) or US market return (fig b) impacts a given stock
exchange, whereas small returns have random impact. a) Conditional probability that the daily return Ri of a given country’s stock market
index has the same sign as the world market return defined by Rm:
PN
j=i
KjRj P
j=i Kj
with Kj the capitalization of the j’th country’s index. b)
Conditional probability that the close-open (+: European markets; circles: Asian markets) return Ri of a given country’s stock market index following
an U.S. open-close, has the same sign as the U.S. open-close return.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026472.g001
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exchange should be priced in terms of the performance of the
global market of exchanges, but with human behavioral
characteristics included in the pricing.
Each index is composed of a given number of stocks. As such
each index, or block, can itself be thought of as a spring-block
system, where now each block in the sub-spring-block system is
representing a given stock. This opens the possibility for a
hierarchical description of the world’s stock exchanges where the
distress of a given stock can either influence directly another stock
in another index, or indirectly through its influence on its index,
can influence other indicies and thereby stocks world-wide. In the
present study we will first concentrate on the direct interrelations
between indicies, leaving out impacts from individual stocks to a
future study [28].
The processing of news is a key building block of the model. It is
however not alway that news will influence one stock index
directly, but can instead influence single stocks, sectors or groups
of stocks, possibly in different markets at the same time. Therefore
the model may be viewed as a kind of factor model, since
idiosyncratic shocks might have almost no effect on the index, as
they might to a certain extent average out. Other factors (interest
rates, oil prices, labor markets) with an impact on many stocks may
have a noticeable effect on the index, possibly on all indices. As a
result a large movement of an index is likely to stem from the
impact of an important factor which is then also likely to have
impact on stocks in other markets. Therefore the model can be
thought of as simply filtering for large index movements, which of
course may happen jointly in many markets, because they are
caused by the same factor. (This paragraph was added using the
remarks of one of the two anonymous referees).
It should be noted that memory effects are present in the model
since it is the cumulative ‘‘stress’’ that determines when a block
‘‘slips’’. In Self Organized Critical (SOC) systems,memory is known
to be an essential ingredient for the criticality of the system [29].
Formally (1)–(3) describes a 2D BK model of earth tectonic plate
motion [30,31]. Our model can thus be seen as an extension of the
2D Olami-Feder-Christensen (OFC) model [30] where each block
is connected to all other blocks with i,j-dependent coupling
constants Cij~aijbij. However, in the OFC model each block is
only connected to its 4 neighbors and has only three (x,y,z-
dependent) coupling constants. In addition, in our model, ‘‘out of
plane’’ stresses are randomly (in both sign and magnitude)
introduced via gi at each block instead of the constant (same sign)
pull of the OFC model. (1)–(3) gives therefore an interesting
perspective of looking at the world’s financial system as a complex
system withself-organizingdynamicsand possibly similar avalanche
dynamics as can be observed for earthquakes. Yet another
interpretation of (1)–(3) is to view the world’s financial system as
set of coupled oscillators. The oscillations happen because of (2)
where stresses are gradually built up and then released. Each stock
exchangecanthereforebeseen asoscillatingwith agivenfrequency,
and this oscillation can in turn influence the frequency of the other
oscillators in the system leading to synchronization effects.
Figure 2. Impact of change blindness on market prices. Circles - observed returns Ri. +’s - the term arising due to change blindness, R
transfer
i .
Squares - shows the difference gi:R
transfer
i {Ri which according to (1)–(3) should be Gaussian distributed. Solid line represents a Gaussian
distribution.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026472.g002
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To verify the hypothesis that large movements in the stock
exchanges play a special role and tend to lead to clustering of
large movements, we have used empirical data to calculate the
conditional probability that a given stock market’s daily return,
R~log(p(tclose)=p(tclose{1)) has the same sign as the daily
return of the world market of indices. The data was
downloaded from the website finance.yahoo.com and used
the opening and closing price of the following 24 stock
exchanges from 1/1/2000 to 1/10/2008: AORD (Australia),
N225 (Japan), KS11 (South Korea) SSEC (China), HSI (Hong
Kong), TWII (Taiwan), STI (Singapore), KLSE (Malysia),
JKSE (Indonesia), BSESN (India), TA100 (Israel), CCSI
(Egypt), FTSE (U.K.), FCHI (France), GDAX (Germany),
SSMI (Switzerland), MIBTEL (Italy), AEX (Netherlands), ATX
(Austria), MERV (Argentine), BVSP (Brazil), GSPC (U.S.),
GSPTSE (Canada) and MXX (Mexico). Only days for which all
stock markets were open were used in the analysis (each market
has its own holidays).
We defined the index of the world market as:
Ri
m:
X N
j=i
KjRj P
j=i Kj
ð4Þ
with Kj the capitalization of the j’th country’s index. We use this
index as a measure of the collective response of the world markets
on a given day on the index i. Notice the i dependency since each
index will have a specific impact from the other indicies world-
wide. Notice also that since we want to avoid ‘‘self-impact’’ i is
excluded in the sum.
From Fig. 1a it is clear that when the world-wide index only
exhibits small changes, little coherence is seen between the
different country’s movements. However, there appears to be a
threshold after which large movements in the world-wide index
lead to synchronization of the individual country’s exchanges, with
the majority tending to move in the same direction. Similar results
have been found for individual stocks of a given stock market
[10,11]. This reinforces our claim that the stock markets world-
Figure 3. Seismographic activity (thin solid line) of price-quakes A(t). Thick solid line represents the world return index normalised
according to capitalisation of the different stock indices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026472.g003
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special role.
We then checked the specific assumptions in (1)–(3) that large
movements of large capital indices should have a particular impact
on smaller capital indices by looking at the effect of both the world
market return and the US market return on the movement of
individual stock exchanges (figure 1). Using the open-close return
of the U.S. stock market gives a clear case to check for such a
‘‘large-move’’ impact. Since the Asian markets close before the
opening of the U.S. markets, they should only be able to price in
this information at their opening the following day. That is, the
‘‘open-close’’ of the Asian markets follow after a ‘‘close-open’’ of
the US market with no stock market information in between. An
eventual ‘‘large-move’’ U.S. open-close should therefore have a
clear impact on the following close-open of the Asian markets. On
the contrary, the European markets are still open when the U.S.
market opens up in the morning, so the European markets have
access to part of the history of the open-close of the U.S. markets.
An eventual ‘‘large-move’’ U.S. open-close would therefore still be
expected to have an impact on the following close-open of the
European markets, but less so than for the Asian markets since
part of the U.S. move would already be priced in when the
European markets closed. Since the opening of the Asian markets
by itself could influence the opening of the European markets, this
furthermore could distort the impact coming from the U.S.
markets. As expected, this effect is seen more clearly for the Asian
markets compared to the European markets in figure 1b.
As an additional check on our assumption (1)–(3) we have
constructed the difference gi~Ri(t){ 1
N{1
PN
j=i aijH(Rcum
j (t{1)w
RC)Rcum
j (t{1)bij from the empirical data of 24 of the world’s leading
stock exchanges using daily data since the year 2000. According to (1)
this difference should be distributed according to a Gaussian
distribution. Using maximum likelihood analysis as given in the
appendix we found the optimal parameters to be:
(c~0:8,t~20:0,RC~0:03,s2~0:0006). Figure 2 shows that for
these parameter choices, our definition of price movements due to
external (random) news does indeed fit a normal distribution. The
obtained values of the optimal parameters suggest a fairly ‘‘global’’
network of stock exchanges with a large influence of pricing across
time zones and pricing not only dominated by the largest capital
index. A priori this seems in agreement with expectations. The value
of Rc is furthermore consistent with the estimate one can retrieve
independently by visual inspection of figure 1. Varying the parameters
we estimate their significance to be within a factor of 2 of the values
given. Lastly, given these optimal parameters, we predicted the sign of
the open/close for each stock exchange using the sign of
R
transfer
i (t)~
1
N 
i
X N
j=i
aijH(Rcum
j (t{1)wRC)Rcum
j (t{1)bij ð5Þ
R
transfer
i describes the part of the return of a given stock index i that is
attributed due to large movements of other stock indices.Using in total
58244 events we found a very convincing 63% success rate of
predicting the sign of the return of the open/close of a given stock
exchange ex ante.
In analogy with earthquakes, we now introduce a measure to
determine the strength or ‘‘seismic’’ activity in the world’s network
of stock exchanges. To do so we suggest to consider each stock
exchange as a seismograph which at any moment in time can
Figure 4. Inset to figure 3: Probability of the size A of a given seismic event. Squares: negative returns, dots: positive returns.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026472.g004
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large price movements of the other stock exchanges world-wide.
This quantity is given by R
transfer
i in (5). The global ‘‘seismic’’
activity at any moment of the world’s stock exchanges can then be
determined as an average of the measurement of each of the
seismographs world-wide as: A(t):1=N
P
i R
transfer
i (t) Using A(t)
defined in this way one can investigate whether such activity could
be used to characterize special periods with high ‘‘tremor’’ activity
of the world’s stock exchanges. Figure 3 shows the recordings of
the ‘‘tremor’’ activity in the world’s stock exchanges which
resembles the recordings seen from seismographs of earth tectonic
plate movements. The large event tail of the probability
distribution function of the activity seen in Figure 4 shows the
familiar power law behavior as seen in the seismic activity of
earthquakes.
As mentioned in [29] memory effects at the system level in SOC
systems are generated dynamically. Only when a SOC system has
entered a steady state does the system exhibit long ranged
correlations with power law events. In this sense the large event tail
of the probability distribution function signals the presence of
memory effects and a steady state of the global network of stock
exchanges.
Most notable is a striking tendency for large ‘‘tremor’’ activity
during down periods of the market. That is, the collective response
of the network of stock exchanges world-wide seems to be stronger
with larger ‘‘price-quakes’’ (positive as well as negative) when the
world is in the ‘‘bear’’ market phase as compared to the ‘‘bull
market’’ phase.
Discussion
We have introduced a new model of pricing for the world’s
stock exchanges that uses ideas from finance [32], physics and
psychology. The model is an extended version of the Burridge-
Knopoff model that originally was introduced to describe earth
tectonic plate movement. We have used an analogy with
earthquakes to get a new understanding of the build up and
release of stress in the world’s network of stock exchanges and have
introduced a measure that correctly captures the enhanced activity
of price movements seen especially during bear markets.
In this sense our ‘‘seismic activity’’ measure gives yet another
measure to assess phases of systemic risk much like the principal
components analysis measure of [3,4] and the index cohesive force
of [5,6]. However it would also be interesting to use our model for
‘‘tipping point’’ analysis using scenario analysis determining
particularly dangerous moments of contagion in the financial
system. Nonlinearity entered the model as the behavioral tendency
of humans to react disproportionately to big changes. As
predicted, such a nonlinear response was observed in the impact
of pricing from one country to another. The nonlinear response
allows a classification of price movements of a given stock index as
either exogenously generated due to specific economic news for
the country in question, or endogenously created by the ensemble
of the world’s stock exchanges reacting like a complex system. The
approach could shed new light on risks on systemic failure when
large financial price-quakes propagate world- wide [28].
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